A restricted defence to revealed preference theory

Authors

Abstract

This paper presents a restricted defence of the revealed preference theory (RPT) considering the critical argumentation of Villacís (Revealed preference versus the utilitarian approach) against it. It is shown that the RPT is an improvement in methodological terms for economic research and an improvement as a formal microeconomic foundation. I will show that, first, the criticisms raised against RPT are misguided insofar as 1. they assume that the aim of RPT is to offer a behaviourist epistemology and 2. they assume that to hold a behaviourist view of preferences is to hold a behaviourist view of microeconomic foundations. Second, I will show that the formal critique raised by Villacís is ineffective because there is an ambiguity as to what players' preferences depend on in the context of strategic games.

Keywords:

philosophy of economics, preferences, revealed preferences, microeconomics, Paul Samuelson