Subsidios a la producción y delegación de la política comercial en una unión aduanera

  • José Méndez-Naya

Abstract

By using a reciprocal dumping model, this paper justifies the existing preferential
trade agreements as being a reaction to a third country export subsidy. On the
other hand, assuming that one of the member countries may set its production
subsidies optimally, the effects on welfare derived from the delegation of customs
union’s commercial policy are addressed. The main result obtained is that in a
non-transferable utility context the union is not sustainable.
Keywords Economic Integration, Market Structure and Firms Strategies, Regionalism and Multilateralism.
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How to Cite
Méndez-Naya, J. (2016). Subsidios a la producción y delegación de la política comercial en una unión aduanera. Estudios de Economía, 29(2), pp. 231-246. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40839/43545
Section
Articles
Published
2016-05-06