Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

  • Aitor Ciarreta Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Universidad del País Vasco, Bilbao
  • Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita Depto. Estudios Económicos y Financieros, Universitas Miguel Hernández, Elche (Alicante)

Abstract

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.
Keywords Optimal punishments, detection lags, collusion sustainability
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How to Cite
Ciarreta, A., & Gutiérrez-Hita, C. (2013). Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game. Estudios de Economía, 40(2), pp. 247-253. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/31033/43306
Section
Articles
Published
2013-01-01