Collective rights in artisanal fisheries and the trade-offs in fisheries policies: An analysis of distributive policies

  • Miguel Jara Magíster © en Economía de Recursos Naturales y del Medio Ambiente, Universidad de Concepción.
  • Jorge Dresdner Profesor Asociado, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción, Research Nucleus on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, e Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR), Victoria 471, Barrio Universitario, Concepción
  • Walter Gómez Profesor Asociado, Departamento de Ingeniería Matemática, Universidad de la Frontera, Av. Francisco Salazar 01145, Temuco, Chile; Investigador Asociado Research Nucleus on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, Universidad de Concepción, Victoria 471, Barrio Universitario, Concepción

Abstract

This research analyzes the potential effects that a redistributive fishing quota policy could have on the profits and employment of the artisanal fisher organizations. We use a multi-objective programming model and apply it to the common sardine and anchovies fisheries in the Biobío Region for year 2011. The results indicate the presence of trade-offs between the equity –profits and equity– employment objectives. Moreover, the results suggest the existence of widespread inefficiencies in the effort allocation within the organizations, independently of the weight given to the different objectives.
Keywords Collective rights, trade-off, multi-objective, distribution, artisanal fisheries
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How to Cite
Jara, M., Dresdner, J., & Gómez, W. (2015). Collective rights in artisanal fisheries and the trade-offs in fisheries policies: An analysis of distributive policies. Estudios de Economía, 42(1), pp. 53-78. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/37257/43274
Section
Articles
Published
2015-09-07