Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation

  • Roberto Contreras

Abstract

We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns
to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower
differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition
we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies
that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable
independent of the differentiation degree.
Keywords Collusion, product differentiation, decreasing returns to scale
Compartir
How to Cite
Contreras, R. (2016). Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation. Estudios de Economía, 35(1), pp. 19-31. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40235/43429
Section
Articles
Published
2016-04-24