Baïou y Balinski (2002) generalized the model of firms-workers allocation to
one in which allocation is planned determining both the allocation of workers
to firms and how much time workers will dedicate to firms.
A planning is stable if there is no pair of firm- worker that could increase their
hours of work together, affecting some less desirable agent.
This article studies the relationship between this problem and a matching
problem, and shows that each stable planning is equivalent to some stable
matching.
Keywords:
Modelo de Planificación, Planificación Estable, Modelo de Matching, Matching Estable
Oviedo, J., & Rubio, A. (2016). Modelo de planificación balanceado y modelo de asignación. Estudios De Economía, 31(1), pp. 39–66. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40858
