Estructura de la negociación salarial e incentivos a innovar

  • Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz
  • María Luz Campos

Abstract

In this article we analyse the effect that the sequence of salary negotiations has
on the firm´s decisions about the adoption of new labour saving technologies.
We show that if the cost of the innovation is sufficiently high, innovations are
related with sequential as well with simultaneous negotiations. In addition, the
cost of the innovation depends on the market size, increases in labour productivity
resulting of the new technology and the reserve salary of workers.
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How to Cite
Barcena-Ruiz, J., & Campos, M. (2016). Estructura de la negociación salarial e incentivos a innovar. Estudios de Economía, 32(1), pp. 5-24. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40868/43496
Section
Articles
Published
2016-05-06