Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?

  • Álvaro Forteza
  • Cecilia Noboa

Abstract

We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more “flexible”. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.
Keywords Discretion, commitment, simple rules, informality, enforcement
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How to Cite
Forteza, ., & Noboa, C. (2019). Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?. Estudios de Economía, 46(1), 31-59. Retrieved from https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/52634/55228
Section
Articles
Published
2019-03-27