Autorregulación con la posibilidad de corrupción

Authors

  • Javier Nuñez
  • Guillermo Díaz
  • Miguel Vargas

Abstract

This work researches about Self Regulatory Organizations’ incentives to exert regulation of quality. The analysis is based upon an agency approach, which involves the existence of a principal, who has the responsibility of monitoring the standard of quality of goods that are provided by the SRO’s members (agents), and to report to whom doesn’t meet that. The motivation for the enforcement is reputational, given that consumers cannot observe the goods’ quality, but rely on the observation of reporting of fraud signals by the SRO to infer it. Therefore, quality emerges endogenously by the strategic interaction between the principal’s incentives to watch and the agent’s tendency towards fraud. This work analyzes how the possibility of corruption impacts upon the SRO’s incentives for the enforcement of standards. Corruption arises when agents discovered in fraudulent activities, pay a bribe and avoid to be punished. The main result is that the more likely equilibrium implies a level of fraud greater than in a world without possibility of corruption. Besides, there is fraud cover up and impunity.

Keywords:

Organismos Autorregulados, credence goods, juegos dinámicos con información incompleta, agente-principal